



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## REVIEWS.

*The Elements of Politics.* By HENRY SIDGWICK. London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1891. — 8vo, xxxii, 623 pp.

In this long-expected work, Professor Sidgwick completes his triad on the moral sciences. At the same time he marks an epoch in English political philosophy, by presenting the first systematic and comprehensive treatise on the subject since Locke — it might almost be said, since Hobbes. His own claim that the void he fills extends no further back than Bentham is modest rather than accurate; for while it will be readily admitted that that fecund thinker wrote much on politics, his productions touching that special topic can hardly be regarded as systematic.

Since the days of the French Revolution English thought has been chary of committing itself to theories of government. The Germans, charmed with Rousseau's *volonté générale*, have devoted libraries of solemn volumes to psychological and metaphysical fantasies about the state, which has been refined into a mere form of thought. But the Britons have never left the ground of hard practicality. They have had little to say about the *begriff* and the *idée* and the *wesen* of the state, but they have written much on the suffrage, on representation, on the methods of administration. Professor Sidgwick's point of view is entirely characteristic of his nationality. He avows himself the follower of Bentham and Austin and Mill. The state with which he undertakes to deal has no profound metaphysical character or significance; its essence is merely the objective fact, obvious to any one, that a relation of habitual command and obedience exists between two bodies of concrete individuals. Assuming this relation, the problem of politics is simple: How shall the incidents of this situation be made to conduce to the greatest happiness of the individuals concerned? Such a definition of the field of work excludes many interesting questions, while at the same time it gives a greater definiteness to the discussions.

Professor Sidgwick's method professes to be exclusively deductive. He doubts that history can give much aid in the problem he seeks to solve. A close logical deduction from accepted principles of human nature is all that he attempts. His criterion of "accepted principles," however, reveals a faith in historical development; for his standard is the judgment of civilized peoples, particularly those of Western Europe. In this method there is obvious that suggestion of *petitio principii* which

Mill finds in all deductive reasoning ; for the "common sense" of Western Europe is but a generalization from facts among which political institutions form an important element. As a matter of fact we find everywhere in Professor Sidgwick's work, along with a most rigorous adherence to the forms of *a priori* reasoning, evidence that the substance of his thought is inductive. While he tries to derive existing institutions from his fundamental principles, he really is conforming the principles to the institutions. It is hard to believe, for example, that his chapter on "Federal and Other Composite States" represents a laborious deduction from the dogmas of utilitarian ethics rather than an intelligent generalization from the constitution of the United States and one or two similar documents. Yet the whole chapter is in terms of the purest abstraction, with but a footnote here and there to indicate that the philosopher ever suspected the existence of any concrete embodiment of his principles. This same characteristic pervades the whole work ; and at times it is a little irritating to realize, at the end of a section of supposed universal philosophy, that it is after all only a bit of ephemeral British politics.

Professor Sidgwick divides his work into two parts. In the first, after laying down his fundamental conceptions of politics, which with some qualifications are those of Austin, he considers the functions of government. His standpoint here is that of moderate individualism ; but it has for its foundation, not an *a priori* assumption that the principle of individualism is sound, but rather the fact that

the legislation of modern civilized communities . . . is in the main framed on an individualistic basis ; and an important school of political thinkers are of opinion that the coercive interference of government should be strictly limited to the application of this principle.

The chapters on property, contract, inheritance, remedies for wrongs, *etc.*, manifest throughout the author's success in seeking not "to propound and establish any new principles not recognized in ordinary thought and discussion." His views on socialistic interference by the government and on taxation are well known from his *Political Economy*.

In Chapter XIV he considers the conceptions of state and nation "as currently used." A state is

a body of human beings, deriving its corporate unity from the fact that its members acknowledge permanent obedience to the same government, which represents the society in its collective capacity and ought to aim in all its actions at the promotion of their common interests.

But this would include nomad tribes ; hence some further definition is necessary. Therefore

we may lay down (1) that in a community that is called a state there is understood to be an effective consciousness of the distinction . . . between the rights and obligations of the community in its corporate capacity and the rights and obligations of the individuals composing it; and (2) that the community so designated is understood to be in settled occupation of a certain territory.

Not a word thus far about the nation. The unity of the state depends "solely on the fact that its members obey a common government." "And I do not think," the author says, "that any other bond is essentially implied in the definition of a state." But he then proceeds to admit that a political society is in an unsatisfactory and unstable condition when that is the only bond, and therefore it is desirable that there should be in addition the bonds implied in the term "nation." The implications of the term cannot be precisely defined. Common origin, common traditions and history, common language or religion, — neither of these can be said exclusively to characterize the nation. The author is forced to believe that the really essential principle is "that the persons composing [the nation] should have a consciousness of belonging to one another, of being members of one body, over and above what they derive from the mere fact of being under one government."

All this seems plausible, but one who has groped about in the realms of German idealism is pained by the simplicity of the whole thing. He misses the *organismus* and the *staatswille* and the *staatsgeist* and the *staatskörper*. It seems as if a great opportunity had been lost when in six hundred pages there is no effort made to enlarge upon the personality of the nation and its necessity and conscious activity in the moral order of the universe.

Part II of the work treats of the structure of government. Here the author works out his conception as to the most desirable form of organization for the government of the modern state, and the proper inter-relationship of its parts. No more in this than in Part I do we find any striking novelty. There is the same calm, judicial consideration of current questions, the same critical but dispassionate balancing of opposing views and the same diffident suggestion now and then of an independent opinion. The author's doctrine, which he generally disguises as "the common sense of the civilized world" or "the best thought of modern times," is in general sound and is always suggestive; but the manner of its presentation will never attract readers. There is a strong suggestion of the later scholastics in the dryness of the style.

Professor Sidgwick accepts the analysis of governmental functions into legislative, executive and judicial, with the proper qualifications, and regards as desirable the substantial independence of the corresponding organs. In the relation of legislature to executive he finds

the criterion of the different types of constitutional government now prevailing, and his classification shows a modification of Bagehot's. The normal form, of which there is no example in existence, he takes as that of an executive appointed by the legislature and dismissible at its will, and this he names "simple parliamentary government." The form exemplified by the German system, in which a considerable degree of independence is retained by the executive, he styles "simple constitutional monarchy," and that embodied in the English system he distinguishes as "English parliamentary government." With the German system he has little sympathy, and a careful balancing of advantages and disadvantages in the English leads him to an apparent preference for a modification of that contained in the constitution of the United States, which he designates as the system of a "periodical executive." While his own nomenclature is not especially happy, his objection to that adopted by Bagehot seems valid :

I have not been able to use Bagehot's conceptions of "Cabinet Government" and "Presidential Government" . . . since they seemed inevitably to mix up two questions which I wished to keep distinct,—the question of the relation of the executive to the legislature, and the question as to the more or less monarchical organization of the executive. [Page 430, note.]

Professor Sidgwick's discussion of "Parties and Party Government" will be generally regarded, I think, as one of the solidest and most useful chapters of his work. He fully realizes and clearly points out the evil tendencies of the two-party system. His suggestion of some use of the *referendum* to reduce the dangers of narrow partisan legislation is interesting.

The author reserves for the conclusion of his work the general classification of forms of government and the careful examination of sovereignty. His treatment of the former topic consists in indicating the modern application of Aristotle's theory, and in showing how representative government as now prevalent embodies that blending of aristocratic and democratic elements which the Greek philosopher regarded as ideal. This chapter distinctly loses in clearness through preceding that on sovereignty. In dealing with the latter difficult subject, Professor Sidgwick first disclaims allegiance to the Austinian dogma (Chapter II) and then, on mature consideration, substantially announces the impossibility of any definite solution of the problem. A simple answer to the question where supreme political power resides must almost always be incorrect, he says, unless the meaning of the question is carefully limited ; and if the latter condition is fulfilled, the answer is likely to be misleading. The grounds on which he bases this conclusion are carefully chosen, but his thought appears not free from

confusion. He seems to discern but not consistently to employ the distinction between the legal and the political sovereign. And he places the subjective motives above the definite formulation of the act of will in the conception of a legally sovereign act. An act of Parliament is made neither more nor less the expression of sovereign will, by the fact that fear of disorder influenced its form. An edict of Louis XV was none the less a sovereign law because framed under the influence of the Pompadour. In determining the law of a given country, such considerations are out of place: in determining the constitution, they have to be regarded. This distinction the author does not closely make.

Professor Sidgwick's work, taken as a whole, fulfils the primary purpose which he announces as embodied in it, namely, "to set forth in a systematic manner the general notions and principles which we use in ordinary political reasonings." It is a useful repository of what political science has achieved; but it adds nothing of consequence to the aggregate of these achievements.

WM. A. DUNNING.

*History of the Great Civil War.* By SAMUEL R. GARDINER.

Volume III: 1647-1649. London and New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. — 678 pp.

In the earlier volumes of his masterly work Mr. Gardiner has traced in all its details the history of the process by which the breach between the English crown and the English nation developed till it resulted in civil war. He has now completed the history of the war itself and brought the narrative down to the execution of Charles I. It is a difficult period to treat, not only on account of the complexity of the subject, but because its characters and events have scarcely yet passed beyond the realm of partisan controversy. Mr. Gardiner is, in the proper sense of the term, the first English historian of the epoch. He is the first Englishman who has brought to the study of the subject the patience, the thoroughness and the impartiality which are requisite to the proper treatment of any period of history, especially one so important as this. The same breadth of sympathy, the same exhaustiveness of research and care in the use of authorities is maintained throughout. Yet it has seemed to the reviewer that in the volumes on the Civil War the distinguished author has not shown so complete a mastery of the subject as in the earlier portions of the work. Repeated perusals, especially of the last volume, have failed to leave upon the mind so clear a picture of Cromwell and of Charles, in the later months of his life, as were obtained of Bacon, Coke, Buckingham and Strafford. This may